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Diminished Corn Production and Ethanol Policy - Should the RFS be Waived?
Market Report

Yr
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4 Wks
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Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,
51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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7.17

7.83
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13.77

16.41

17.17

12.00

12.91

13.18

3.63

3.88

4.18

Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .

*No Market

The short corn crop and soaring prices due to the drought
have brought forth appeals to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to use its discretionary power to waive the
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) for 2012, 2013, or both.
This, it is reasoned, would reduce ethanol production,
therefore reduce corn consumption by the ethanol industry and
reduce corn prices. The desirability of these objectives aside,
there are some pitfalls in the reasoning, which will be reviewed
here.
To provide perspective, this is another expression of the
concern about using food for fuel, this time when grain
supplies are limited by drought. It is true that grain shortfalls
and price spikes in recent years have surely been exacerbated
by the mandated use of corn for ethanol. It is also true that in
the long-run we may have difficulty feeding the world's
population, even if no grain is used for fuel. But the issue at
hand is one of the short-run, whether less "food" should be
used for fuel in this drought year. The impact of eliminating
the RFS for just a year or so is quite different than the impact
of eliminating it permanently.
The Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS)

Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

This issue is another article in a series addressing drought
conditions, economic impacts and resources for Nebraska
agriculture.
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The RFS2, passed by Congress in 2007, requires motor
fuel distributors to blend ethanol into the gasoline supply, 13.2
billion gallons of corn ethanol per year (bgy) in 2012, 13.8 bgy
in 2013. That's about 13.6 bgy during the marketing year for
this year's reduced corn crop.
Fuel distributors must use Renewable Identification
Numbers (RINs) to prove that they have sold their share of the
13.2 bgy, purchase RINs to show that someone else has, or pay
stiff penalties. RINs originate when batches of ethanol are
produced. They are separated from the ethanol when it is
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blended, to become proof that a specific number of gallons of
ethanol has been blended into gasoline supplies.
Under some circumstances, blenders find it convenient
to blend more than the obligated quantity of ethanol, and they
may sell the excess RINs to others who blend less than their
obligated amounts. They may also keep the RINs to meet
future blending requirements. The number of excess RINs
available to be carried forward to the coming marketing year
is currently estimated to be about 2.5 billion gallons. Blenders
will be able to use these RINs to satisfy their mandated
blending requirements next year, potentially reducing the
amount of ethanol they purchase to as little as 11 bgy, while
still complying with the 13.6 bgy RFS mandate. Now for
some other considerations.
The "Blend Wall"
Curiously, there exists a "blend wall" that allows
delivery of only about 13.3 bgy of ethanol, an amount smaller
than the 13.6 bgy mandate. The blend wall is calculated as ten
percent of the 13.3 bgy of gasoline motor fuel that the Energy
Information Agency expects to be consumed. It's considered
to be a wall because of the lack of blender pumps and other
infrastructure needed to deliver blends greater than ten
percent (E10), and related concerns that most United States
automobiles may be damaged by blends in excess of that
amount. Obviously, there is some flexibility in this "wall."
…and the "Octane Wall"
Gasoline blending technology reduces blenders' ability
to adjust to an RFS waiver in the short-run. The oil refining
industry has adjusted its formulation of the primary gasoline
blendstock (RBOB) to 84 octane, which when blended with
ten percent ethanol produces 87 octane "regular." To
maintain this octane level with less ethanol in the blend would
require a new RBOB formulation, and that may require
months to achieve if indeed the industry believed the change
were relatively permanent.1
Potential Responses to a Waiver of the RFS
The blend wall limits the maximum amount of ethanol
that the fuel industry can utilize, while the octane wall limits
the minimum amount of ethanol it can utilize. While both
walls have some elasticity, they nonetheless limit response to
changes in regulations and prices.
The corn-ethanol arithmetic with no RFS waiver is
roughly as follows. Over the corn marketing year, ethanol
production could range from about 11 bgy to the full 13.6
bgy, requiring from 2.75 to 3.4 billion bushels of corn 2 from
the predicted 10.8 billion bushel crop. The actual amount will
be chosen by the blenders, nearer the lower figure if ethanol
1

Irwin and Good, and Tyner, et al., bring this issue to our attention
and discuss it in more detail.

2

A bushel of corn converts to about 2.8 gallons of ethanol, but about
a third of the corn is returned to the feed grain supply in the form of
distillers grains and solubles.

price is high relative to gasoline (and if octane adjustments can
be made), nearer the higher figure if ethanol price is low, but
no higher because of the blend wall. The Ethanol:RBOB
futures price ratio has risen from about .70 last spring to .90,
indicating a weakening trend in this incentive to blend. So
under business as usual, changes in corn use for ethanol will
likely be quite small, despite the high corn price.
If the EPA were to waive the RFS, resulting in some
smaller quantity of mandated ethanol use, how would the
picture differ from the one above? The octane wall would still
be a strong deterrent to utilizing much less than the current
13.3 bgy, which would imply no change in ethanol production
despite the waiver. Any reductions in ethanol purchases would
depend on the extent to which the RBOB formulation can be
adjusted within the waiver time frame, and that is not very well
known.
The above reasoning suggests that an EPA waiver will
not have a large effect on the amount of corn purchased by the
ethanol industry. Babcock, on the other hand, concluded from
using Iowa State's Center for Agriculture and Rural
Development (CARD) economic simulation model, that a
waiver could decrease corn prices from $0.58-2.49/bu, but this
analysis did not incorporate the influence of the octane wall.
Tyner, et al., performed a similar analysis using Purdue's
GTAP economic simulation model, finding that the impact of
the waiver varied from none to $3.32/bu., again without
considering an "octane wall."
However, both Tyner, et al., and Irwin and Good
concluded from qualitative evaluations similar to mine above,
that a waiver would have limited impact because the
combination of the octane wall and the blend wall. The
consensus of economists is that a one-year waiver of the RFS2
mandate would not have much impact on corn use and prices.
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